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ABSTRACT Whereas most studies find the poor in Africa to be more vulnerable to bribery because of their lower
socio-economic status, this paper proposes institutional differences as an alternative explanation. Because poor
people are unable to afford privately provided services, they must use public services. In relying on the state more
often, the poor become more vulnerable to bribery. Analyses of Afrobarometer data show that the poor are not
more likely to pay bribes for state monopolised services. The poor’s disproportionate vulnerability to bribery for
choice services is a function of their greater likelihood to have contact with the state.
Corruption imposes political, economic and social costs on societies where it is widespread and the
costs are unequally distributed (see Heywood, 2015, part IV). In the words of UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan (2004, p. iii), ‘Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately diverting funds intended for
development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, and feeding inequality and
injustice’. Empirical research in Africa has consistently found that the impoverished are more likely to
pay bribes than those who are well off (Justesen & Bjornskov, 2012, 2014; Kaffenberger, 2012; Peiffer
& Rose, 2014; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2007). From a rational choice economic perspective, this
appears the opposite of what might be expected. Bribe-seeking officials should target better off people
because they have more money to pay bribes, the marginal cost of a bribe is less, and the marginal
utility of the time saved in getting services is greater (compare with Becker, 1968). That the poor may
be more likely to be bribe payers has worrying consequences. Corrupt exchanges with state bureau-
cracy can be instrumental in shaping trust in and perceived legitimacy of governments and the broader
national governance frameworks in which they are located (Lavelle, Razafindrakoto, & Roubaud,
2008; Seligson, 2002). Insofar as the poor are more likely bribe payers, we should also expect to
observe state legitimacy and trust crises acutely experienced within those communities, as well.
An effective policy response to the issue requires an understanding of the persisting relationship
between poverty and bribery. Sociological theories of differences in life chances (Weber, 1958) have
been used to explain the association. This perspective posits that the poor are more often made to pay
bribes because bureaucrats view them as being easy targets, believing that they will lack the knowl-
edge, financial resources and social connections to resist requests for bribes. In effect, poverty is an
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indicator of inequality in power (see for example Rothstein, 2011, p. 68ff; Uslaner, 2015, p. 200ff).
Thus, in Hunt’s (2007) phrase, ‘Corruption hits people when they are down’ (p. 574).
An institutional theory offers an alternative explanation. It explains who pays bribes as a function of
differences in the public services that people contact. Public services can be distinguished between
those that are a state monopoly such as law enforcement, and services for which a choice may be
offered between state and non-state providers, such as education and health care. Regardless of
income, everyone must contact public officials to make use of state monopoly services (Klitgaard,
1988). However, where there is a choice of providers, better off people may avoid contact with a
corrupt institution by paying for services from a non-state provider while the poor lack the money to
exit from the state service (Hirschman, 1970). For this reason, the poor are more vulnerable to bribery
insofar as they are more likely than the better off to have contact with the state to get choice services.
If the institutional theory is more accurate, there are significant policy implications. Promoting
privatisation, for example, may help those able to afford privately provided services to avoid bureau-
cratic corruption, but still leave poorer citizens disproportionately more vulnerable. Such a conse-
quence would increase inequality, rather than reduce it.
The innovative contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretically grounded empirical test of
whether the correlation between poverty and the payment of bribes for public services in Africa is
influenced more by the sociological vulnerability of poor people to exploitation by public officials or
by having more contact with public services from which better off people can exit.1
Testing these alternative explanations requires going beyond the association between poverty and public
services in general. It requires comparing the effect of poverty on the payment of bribes for two different
types of public services, those for which the state has a monopoly and services for which there is a choice
between state and non-state providers. In strong contrast to the findings of other studies on bribery in
Africa, we find that poverty is not a uniformly significant determinant of bribery. Instead, statistical
analysis of the freshly released 34-country Afrobarometer survey shows that institutional differences
between services matter; the poor are not more likely to be bribe payers to state monopoly services. A
further two-step analysis demonstrates that poor people are disproportionately vulnerable to paying bribes
for choice services because they are more likely to contact those services than the better off.
1. Theories and hypotheses about poverty and bribery
The theory of the powerless poor characterises individuals in poverty as being an ‘easy target’ for
extracting bribes because they have less understanding and knowledge of their rights to receive
services, less status and money to demand their rights and less political influence to see that they
are delivered (Brady & Burton, 2015; Piven & Minnete, 2015; Sefton, 2006). This perspective
emphasises that poverty is a proxy for a lack of power. When confronted by demands for a bribe
from public officials, the poor are less capable of resisting. The hypothesis that follows is:
H1 (Poverty): Poor people are more likely than the better off to pay bribes because they lack the
capacity to resist public officials demanding money.
A field experiment in Mexico City illustrates how being perceived as one of the powerless poor can
influence bribery, Fried, Lagunes, and Venkataramani (2010) staged minor traffic infractions in the
same location using four different cars: two newer luxury cars and two older inexpensive cars. Traffic
police overwhelmingly pulled over and requested bribes from drivers making the infraction in
inexpensive cars. In subsequent interviews the officers explained that they were prone to ignore the
infractions committed in more expensive cars because they feared that wealthier drivers would have
personal connections with the judiciary or their own superiors in the police force, and use these to
punish them. A secondary reason was that past experiences had taught the officers that interactions
with higher status people were time-consuming and arduous, since they had a better understanding of
the law than poorer citizens and often attempted to argue their way out of a ticket. In effect, targeting
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people with less money for bribes was a more efficient and less risky way for officials to pocket
money.
Cross-national analyses of bribery using Afrobarometer survey data have found consistent evidence
of a positive poverty-bribery association (Justesen & Bjornskov, 2012, 2014; Kaffenberger, 2012;
Peiffer & Rose, 2014; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2007). Justesen and Bjornskov’s (2014) study
stands out because the impact of poverty on bribery is their primary focus. Using the 2005 third-round
Afrobarometer survey of 18 countries they find, after controlling for the potential effects of other
variables, that poverty is positively associated with an index capturing the frequency with which
respondents have paid a bribe to any service, whether a bribe was paid to each of the five services
asked about, and whether a bribe was paid by anyone in the respondent’s household in the last year.
However, the link between poverty and bribery is not so consistently found in other studies focusing
on different regions and in some cases the opposite is found. For example, income is positively
associated with bribery for health care in Vietnam (Nguyen Van, 2008), for several services in Mexico
(Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia 2008; Morris, 2008) in Uganda and Peru (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012),
and across multi-country samples (Mocan, 2008). However, Morris (2008), Rose and Mishler (2010)
and Tavits (2010) all fail to find a significant association between income and bribery in Mexico,
Russia and Estonia respectively.
By contrast with the ‘easy target’ hypothesis, a second theory emphasises institutional differences
between services that are a monopoly of the state and those for which there is a choice between state
and non-state providers (Klitgaard, 1988). When the state lacks a monopoly over a service, there is in
principle a choice for users between using a government provided service where public officials can
make demands for bribes or turning to a market or not-for-profit provider (Hirschman, 1970). Health
and education are familiar examples of choice services and in all but totalitarian societies, non-
governmental organisations can and do provide them to some degree. Justesen and Bjornskov
(2012, 2014) rightly point out that the option to exit the state service system has a cash cost that is
rarely within the reach of the poor. Since poorer citizens are less able to afford the charges involved in
obtaining privately provided services, they are more likely to come into contact with choice services
than wealthier citizens able to pay private service fees. If public officials set bribes on the basis of what
an individual can pay, then the cost of paying them bribes will not prevent the poor from using these
services (Kauffmann, Montoriol-Garriga, & Recanatini, 2008) and more frequent use will result in
greater vulnerability to bribery.
Unlike choice services, by definition services that are a state monopoly do not give people the
opportunity of exiting from what may be perceived to be a corrupt institution. Monopoly services
include law enforcement through the courts and police and the local issuance of permits and licenses
for housing, maintaining an automobile and other documents that must be state-supplied if they are to
be valid. If monopoly providers seek bribes from all users at a similar rate, it follows that all users of
these services will be similarly vulnerable to requests for bribes. The institutional differences between
choice and monopoly services suggest two complementary institutional hypotheses:
H2A: (Choice) Poor people are more likely than the better off to pay bribes for choice services
because they are more likely to be in contact with choice services.
H2B. (Monopoly) Better off people are as likely to pay bribes as poor people for monopoly services
because they cannot exit from contact with monopoly services.
Institutional theories postulate that bribery is the result of a two-step process of contingent interactions
with public services. The first step is that citizens must come into contact with a public service. Only if
there is contact does the second step, paying a bribe, become contingently possible. This means, for
example, that elderly people are less likely to pay a bribe for education services than those of child-
rearing age, while they are more likely to be vulnerable to bribery for health services because they tend
to have more health problems.
Insofar as the theory underlying the institutional hypothesis is correct, variations in contact with
particular public services are related to life-cycle characteristics as well as poverty. If the influence of
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these factors on contact is not taken into account, statistical analyses testing for the influence of
poverty on the likelihood of paying a bribe can be misleading. Without accounting for the influence of
poverty on contact with a service, analyses of bribery may show that the poor are significantly more
likely bribe payers than the better off. When contact differences are accounted for, analyses may
instead find that while poverty positively influences the likelihood of having contact with a service, it
has no independent effect on bribing. This would mean the poor are disproportionate bribe payers
because of their contact patterns, and not because they are more likely to be victimised once in contact
with a public service. None of the many studies of poverty and bribery in Africa have appropriately
accounted for contact patterns.2 The logic of a two-step model is:
H3. (Contact) If differences in contact with public services are taken into account, there is no
significant difference in the likelihood of poorer and better off people paying bribes.
This paper advances our understanding of the process of bribery by taking into account the differential
effect of poverty on the likelihood of individuals having contact with choice and monopoly services.
First, we categorise citizens into non-bribe payers and bribe-payers; the latter category is further
divided into those paying bribes for state monopoly services, for choice services, and for both types of
services. Secondly, we test the extent to which poverty influences the odds of being a bribe payer for
each type of service, as opposed to being a non-bribe payer. Finally, we test the importance of
differential contact rates in making the poor more vulnerable to bribery for choice services by using
two-stage Heckman analysis. It estimates the extent to which poverty’s influence on bribery is a
function of having a higher likelihood of coming into contact with the state to obtain choice services.
2. Measuring bribery: the Afrobarometer data
To test our hypotheses we analyse data from the fifth round of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in
2011–2013. A total of 51,605 respondents, selected through multi-stage sampling, were interviewed. It
covered 34 countries across the continent from southern Africa through east, central and west Africa
and five north African countries (www.afrobarometer.org). This coverage is almost double the number
of countries in its 2005 third round, which has most often been used for the analysis of bribery in
Africa (see for example Justesen & Bjornskov, 2014). While the choice of countries was determined
by the availability of institutions for fieldwork and political conditions (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-
Boadi, 2005), the populations sampled do cover more than 70 per cent of the total population of
Africa.
The Afrobarometer includes five explicit questions about bribery for specific services. Respondents
are asked: In the past year, how often, if ever, have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to
government officials in order to get: a document or permit?, water or sanitation services?, treatment at
a local health clinic or hospital?, a place in a primary school?, or avoid a problem with the police like
passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest? (Q61A-E). Responses are coded as: never, once or
twice, several times, many times, always, and no contact with a service in the past year. The proportion
of Afrobarometer respondents reporting the payment of a bribe varies to a limited degree between
services. Obtaining a government permit or official document is the service most subject to bribery; 16
per cent report that they have paid a bribe to do so in the past year, 15 per cent report paying a bribe
for health services, 14 per cent bribed the police, 10 per cent bribed education services and 8 per cent
paid a bribe for water or other utility services.
Altogether, 29 per cent of Afrobarometer respondents reported paying a bribe in the past year to
any service, while 71 per cent did not do so. The proportion of non-bribe payers is much lower
than what would be expected from a reading of difficult-to-replicate ethnographic studies that
generalise about ‘a moral economy of corruption in Africa’ (Olivier de Sardan, 1999; see also
Ekeh, 1975). Sceptics assert that this is due to survey respondents under-reporting their actual
experience of bribery. One of the simplest ways for a person to conceal paying a bribe is to reply
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‘don’t know’ or refuse to give an answer when asked about doing so. Afrobarometer respondents
rarely refuse to give an explicit answer. For each service, an average of less than 1 per cent said
don’t know or refused to give an answer, which is far lower than the non-response to questions
about income. For example, in the 2012 round of the European Social Survey (http://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org/), when asked about their income 11 per cent refused to give an answer
and an additional 10 per cent replied ‘don’t know’.
Of the five services, the state holds a monopoly over the provision of official documents and permits
and policing. We label education and health services as choice services since they are provided by both
state and private actors. Water and sanitation services are more difficult to categorise, because in some
places they are provided by the state, but in others they are provided by non-governmental means or
citizens have a choice.3 Therefore, water and sanitation services are not included in our analyses. The
majority of people who pay a bribe do so for only one type of service: 35 per cent only pay a bribe for
monopoly services and 24 per cent pay a bribe just for choice services. Two in five report paying a
bribe for both types of services.
2.1. Measuring poverty
Since many Africans do not receive a regular money income and many subsist on casual income from
trading and non-monetised production of food and services, the Afrobarometer survey does not ask
respondents about their cash income. As is appropriate in countries in which people meet their needs
with a variety of resources (Bratton, 2008; Rose, 2009, chapter 8), to measure the experience of
poverty the Afrobarometer asks a battery of questions about how often during the past year respon-
dents, or anyone in their family, have had to go without basic necessities. In the African context to ask
about ‘family’ when measuring poverty recognises that because many households in Africa have very
‘flexible membership’ proximity to poverty may be misrepresented if questions are limited to a
household (Randall & Coast, 2015). The fifth Afrobarometer round asks about doing without food,
water, medical care, cooking fuel, and a cash income (Q8A-E). Response codes range from (1) never
to (4) always. A substantial majority, 84 per cent, said they or a family member had gone without at
least one of these necessities at some point in the past year and the mean family had gone without at
least two necessities.
Following the lead of others in the literature (Bratton, 2008; Bratton et al., 2005; Justesen &
Bjornskov, 2014; Peiffer & Rose, 2014), we combined the responses to these questions into a single
poverty index. A principal component factor analysis finds that the five items load on a single
dimension with an eigen value of 2.65. Our poverty index ranges from −1.31 to 2.93, with a higher
score indicating greater poverty; the mean score for the entire sample is 0.02. The mean poverty index
for payers of bribes only for monopoly services is 0.04 while the score for those who have only paid a
bribe for non-monopoly services is much higher, 0.36. Although these figures do not take into account
the potential impact of other factors, they do offer support for hypothesis H2a; non-monopoly bribe
payers are poorer, on average, than other types of bribe payers.
3. The effect of differences in services on bribery
Our institutional theory predicts that whether poor people are more likely than the better off to pay
bribes varies between choice and monopoly services. Poverty is expected to make a significant
difference for bribery for choice services but not for monopoly services. To test whether our
hypotheses are supported we analyse Afrobarometer data using multinomial logistic regression in
STATA, version 13.1. It separately estimates the probability of poverty having a significant impact on
a respondent paying a bribe for choice services only (coded as 1), for monopoly services only (coded
as 2), or for both types of services (coded as 3) as compared to the base-line category of people who
do not pay a bribe for any service (coded as 4). Since poverty is unlikely to be the sole influence on
bribe payment, the regression controls for other variables that have been found to influence the
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payment of bribes in Africa (see Justesen & Bjornskov, 2014; Rose & Peiffer, 2015, table 6.2). The
Online Appendix gives details of the coding of all variables.
In order to focus on individual influences on bribery, we use fixed effects at the country level. In all
analyses we weight each national sample with its country weights and then equally to avoid giving a
country with a larger sample a disproportionate influence on the results, and, using Stata’s survey
commands, we also cluster the standard errors at the country level. Since the total number of
respondents is in the tens of thousands, we regard relationships as statistically significant if there is
a p-value of less than 0.001. To estimate the size of the impact of significant influences, we report
predicted probability shifts calculated after holding the effect of all other variables constant. They
articulate the extent to which a change from the minimum to the maximum value of an influence will
increase or decrease the probability of paying a bribe when the influence of all other variables is held
at their means. Because they are standardised (minimum to maximum), the size of the estimated shifts
are comparable across variables.
As the first hypothesis predicts, the first two columns of Table 1 show that among those who pay
bribes for both choice and monopoly services, the likelihood of paying bribes is higher for poor people
than for better off Africans. This finding is consistent with other studies on bribery in Africa that do
not distinguish between services for which there is institutional choice and those that are state
monopolies (Justesen & Bjornskov, 2012; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2007).
The multinomial logit also separately tests whether poverty significantly affects the payment of
bribes by those who only do so for choice or for monopoly services. As predicted by institutional
hypotheses 2A and 2B, the results in Table 1 confirm that differences in institutional services matter.
Poverty positively influences the odds of paying a bribe for choice services. Holding the effects of all
else constant, a minimum to maximum shift in the poverty score is associated with a 6 per cent
increase in the probability of paying a bribe for a choice service compared to not doing so. Since this
predicted probability shift is the highest of all variables tested, this means that poverty is the most
influential factor tested, differentiating between a respondent paying a bribe or not doing so for a
choice-service.
In the monopoly column of Table 1, the multinomial logit reports an important null finding: being
worse off is no more likely to affect bribe-paying than being better off. This shows that previous
Table 1. Paying bribes for services: multinomial logistic regression
Both types Choice only Monopoly only
PP shift P-value PP shift P-value PP shift P-value
Poverty 0.12 0.000 0.06 0.000 −0.02 0.099
Education 0.02 0.000 −0.01 0.706 0.07 0.000
Urban 0.02 0.000 0.01 0.005 0.01 0.000
Female −0.01 0.000 0.01 0.000 −0.05 0.000
Age −0.04 0.000 −0.02 0.001 −0.05 0.000
Voluntary assn. 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.157 0.01 0.000
Religious group 0.02 0.000 0.00 0.136 0.01 0.014
Political contact 0.03 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.02 0.000
Patron 0.18 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.06 0.000
Has party 0.00 0.071 0.01 0.020 0.01 0.081
Perceived corruption 0.07 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.06 0.000
F 64.92
Prob>F 0.000
Notes: Results are from a multinomial logistic regression, with the baseline category being a non-bribe payer. PP
shifts are the estimated shift in the predicted probability of the payment of a bribe by a person in the named
category compared to a non-bribe payer. The numerical value is an estimate of the change in the probability of
paying a bribe when a minimum to maximum change is made in the respective independent variable.
Source: Afrobarometer survey (www.afrobaromter.org), 2011–2013, 34 countries with 50,393 respondents.
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African studies may have been misleading; by failing to differentiate between types of services, they
have concluded that poverty uniformly increases the likelihood of paying bribes for all public services
(Justesen & Bjornskov, 2012, 2014; Kaffenberger, 2012; Peiffer & Rose, 2014; Razafindrakoto &
Roubaud, 2007). The lack of a significant association supports our institutional hypothesis 2. When
compared to the odds of avoiding bribery altogether, the poor have the same odds as the better off to
pay a bribe for monopoly services.
In theories of the powerlessness of poor people, lacking the resources to obtain necessary goods is but
one feature of a syndrome of social and economic handicaps generally associated with poverty. The
distinctiveness of choice services is shown by the fact that three other socio-economic characteristics
often associated with bribery vulnerability – education, age and urban residence – each fail to have a
significant influence on whether a person pays a bribe for a choice service. This emphasises that as far as
paying a bribe for a service is concerned, it is the cash nexus that counts rather than the social status or
knowledge associated with education or age. By contrast, for paying bribes for monopoly services, all
three variables are statistically significant. Education is especially likely to boost payment of a bribe for
monopoly services, perhaps a reflection of people with more education also being more likely to make
use of local government documents and the courts. Urbanites are also more likely to pay bribes for
monopoly services. The estimated effect of urbanisation is small, being an urbanite only increases the
probability of being a bribe payer by 1–2 per cent, depending on the type of service.4
Being female reduces the chances of being a monopoly bribe payer and a bribe payer to both types
of services, but increases the chances of being a choice-service bribe payer. This effect may reflect the
fact that gendered social norms prompt women to come into contact more with the choice services we
examine – health and education – while men are more likely to deal with the police and with local
government offices when a household or business needs a document or permit (Wängnerud, 2015).
In common with many other studies of the payment of bribes (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012; Mocan, 2008;
Morris, 2008; Peiffer & Rose, 2014) the perception of institutions as corrupt has a significant and
substantial effect on bribery. People who see institutions as corrupt are 6 per cent more likely to be a
bribe payer for monopoly services and 7 per cent more likely to be a bribe payer for both choice and
monopoly services, as compared to the likelihood of being a non-bribe payer. The relationship
between perceptions and the payment of bribes may be endogenous – those who have paid a bribe
for a public service may be more likely to perceive officials as corrupt or reciprocally a perceived high
level of corruption in the public sector may encourage people to pay a bribe because it is considered
the normal thing to do when dealing with public officials.5
Having initiated political contact with an influential person, having been approached by a politician
with election incentives (patron), and having identified with a political party also have a consistent
positive impact on being a bribe payer in any of the categories. The two indicators of social capital
networks facilitating the payment of bribes are contrary to Robert Putnam’s (2000) theory that social
capital promotes civic norms and good governance. In the African context, social capital networks can
serve as social institutions that help individuals to find how to get the public service that they want by
bribery if formal entitlement or informal personal links are not effective. This is somewhat in line with
Isakson’s (2015) finding that bribery patterns in Africa vary systemically along ethnic lines; belonging
to influential ethnic groups is associated with a greater probability of having experienced corruption.
While social capital links are positive for individuals who want to obtain a public service by whatever
means necessary, they are negative in terms of promoting good governance (compare with Rose, 2009,
chapter 7).
4. The role of contact
Our third hypothesis offers a two-step explanation: the poor are more vulnerable to bribery for choice
services because their poverty means they have more contact with these public services than the better
off. In other words, the disproportionate vulnerability to paying bribes for choice services is a function
of greater reliance on the state for these services. Going beyond Justesen and Bjornskov (2014), who
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did not account for differential contact with institutions, in the following pages we test whether
institutional differences in choice or monopoly explain the higher rate of paying bribes among poor
Africans.
4.1. Measuring contact with choice services
To test the contact hypothesis, we need a measure for contact with choice services. Unlike other cross-
national Barometer surveys, the Afrobarometer has not asked whether the respondent has been in
contact with a service before asking about paying a bribe (Rose & Peiffer, 2015, chapter 3) and the
options it offers for no contact are not mutually exclusive: ‘never paid a bribe’ or ‘no reported
experience in the past year’. If ‘no experience’ is used as the appropriate response for not having
contact, then only 22 per cent of the population would have had no contact with health services, and
30 per cent with education services. These figures are a third or more lower than results of surveys that
ask contact questions with mutually exclusive alternatives (see Rose & Peiffer, 2015, p. 30).
Fortunately, other Afrobarometer questions do unambiguously ask respondents about contact with
health and education choice services. Q67D and Q67E give respondents the option of answering that
they have never tried to obtain the service’ after being asked: ‘How easy or difficult it is to obtain
[education/health] services from government?’ Six additional questions are asked about potential
problems encountered when accessing public education (Q68A-F) and six about health (Q69A-F)
services. Again, respondents can report that they have not used the service in the last 12 months. To
construct our contact measure, we cross-checked responses to all of these questions. We first coded all
reporting having had no experience with the service as having no contact (Q61C and Q61E) and then
coded all reports of never having tried to get the service (Q67D and Q67E) as not having contact.
Using the questions about encountering problems, we also coded all reports of not having had
experience with the service as not having contact with it (Q68A-F and Q69A-F). Finally, we also
confirmed that any report of having paid a bribe for the service is treated as also having had contact.
According to this effort, an estimated 70 per cent of the population has come into contact with
government health services; 55 per cent with public education institutions; and 75 per cent have
contacted at least one of the choice services.
4.2. Modelling the stage of contact: Heckman analyses
We use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage selection linked probit model to test what impact poverty has on
the likelihood of having contact with and paying a bribe. At the first stage, the model estimates how
poverty influences the likelihood of having contact with choice services. After accounting for
poverty’s influence on contact, the second stage tests whether poverty has an independent impact on
paying a bribe (Table 2). The Heckman selection model accounts for the fact that those who have had
contact with the state are not a randomly selected sample, and allows us to test the extent to which the
same factors that impact the likelihood of having contact with the state also influence bribery. In other
words, it assumes that the two stages are interrelated. The Wald test of independent equations tests
whether the assumption is fair to make. The result of our Wald’s test rejects the null hypothesis that the
two equations determining contact and bribery are independent (Wald’s test p-value: 0.006). It thus
confirms that the Heckman model is appropriate to use. We include in the Heckman analysis the same
independent variables as in the multinomial logistic analysis.
The two-stage analysis strongly supports our theory of the importance of institutional services:
poverty is a significant positive predictor of contact with choice services, but after its influence on
contact is accounted for, it is not a significant predictor of paying a bribe for those services. Moreover,
of all the independent variables, poverty has the strongest impact: the poorest Africans are 11 per cent
more likely to have contact with health and/or education services. As predicted in hypothesis 3, after
accounting for poverty’s influence on contact, poverty has no significant effect on the payment of
bribes for choice services. Even though the total number of bribes paid by poorer Africans for health
and education services is greater than that paid by the better off, the Heckman analysis shows that this
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is due to poorer people making up a disproportionate number of the users of choice services, because
better off people are better able to exit by paying for non-state services.
As social capital theories predict, people are significantly more likely to contact choice services if
they have a political patron, can ask a politician or public official for help, have a party identification
or belong to a voluntary association or religious group. Whereas a simple logit model finds that having
political contacts and a patron significantly increases the likelihood of paying a bribe, accounting for
their influence on contact reverses the effect. Africans who have social capital networks not only use
them to access public services but to reduce the need to pay a bribe (compare Tables 1 and 2). Among
socio-economic characteristics, education has no significant influence on contact, but more educated
people are significantly less likely to pay a bribe for choice services, presumably because they are
better informed about their rights to obtain them. Women are marginally more likely to contact choice
services than men and, when they do so, to be subject to paying a bribe. Age has no effect on either
contact or bribery.
Contrary to other findings, the perception of corruption does not have a significant effect on whether
a person contacts a public service nor is there a significant association between perceptions and paying
a bribe. Whereas in the single-stage logit model urbanisation was significantly associated with paying
a bribe for choice services it had no significant effect on bribery in the two-stage analysis. Instead it
found that it marginally reduced contact because of the greater availability of non-state alternatives in
cities (Table 2).
5. Conclusions
Up to a point, our research confirms the sociological theory that the ‘poor pay more’ (Caplovitz, 1967)
not only for conventional consumer goods but in bribes for public services that are meant to be
delivered without charge. However, comparing the payment of bribes for services that are a state
monopoly and those for which there is a choice reveals institutional differences in contact as the
primary cause of the poor paying more bribes. Being poor does not increase the odds of being a bribe
payer for services that are a state monopoly, because there is no alternative to their use. This challenges
the sociological theory that the poor will be more likely to pay bribes because they are more vulnerable
Table 2. Contact and bribery for choice services: Heckman linked probit
Contact Bribery
PP shift P-value PP shift P-value
Poverty 0.11 0.000 0.03 0.270
Education 0.01 0.231 −0.03 0.002
Urban −0.02 0.001 0.01 0.017
Female 0.01 0.011 0.02 0.001
Age 0.00 0.921 −0.03 0.065
Voluntary assn. 0.04 0.000 −0.01 0.005
Religious group 0.02 0.000 −0.01 0.119
Political contact 0.05 0.000 −0.02 0.001
Patron 0.10 0.000 −0.02 0.018
Has party 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.403
Perceived corruption 0.00 0.512 0.00 0.873
F (prob>F) 28.87 (0.000)
Rho −0.814
Wald’s test of Independent Equations 7.46 (0.006)
Notes: Results are from a Heckman selection model, of linked probit equations. PP shifts are the
estimated shift in the predicted probability of having contact or paying a bribe when a minimum
to maximum change is made in the respective independent variable.
Source: Afrobarometer survey, 2011–2013, 34 countries with 50,393 respondents.
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to being exploited than are better off people. The critical influence in paying a bribe is not the lower
status of poor people but the lack of money to turn to a non-state institution to avoid use of a service
where corruption is perceived as being widespread.
Methodologically, our approach challenges the simple cost-benefit calculation that individuals
will pay a bribe for a service if it is deemed worth the cost (Becker, 1968; cf. della Porta &
Vanucci, 1999). For a public official soliciting a bribe, the cash cost of providing a service is nil,
since it is funded by the state. The chief cost is the risk of punishment if exposed; the likelihood
is low when corruption is common. For a poor person, the cost of a bribe can be adjusted to
what he or she can pay, since the proceeds are all profit to the official and the alternative is to
do without a choice service such as health care or education. For a monopoly service, the price
of a bribe can be adjusted upwards to take into account the user’s ability to pay and the fact that
the user has no choice. This is especially so when a service is an obligation and there is no
alternative source for a license to drive an automobile or a police order. However, if there is a
choice, then a better off person has two alternatives: to pay a bribe that is less than the cost of
the non-state alternative or to avoid the state service and ostensibly pay more for non-state
provided choice services. Insofar as this happens, it implies that, even if poor people do not
have to pay a bribe to use the state’s education and health services, they are nonetheless
suffering from the receipt of inferior services.
Expanding choice through the increased privatisation of public services has been a prominent policy
response to bribery and inefficiency. It is promoted on the assumption that profit-making institutions
will not only be more efficient in producing outputs but also more effective in reducing any tendency
of their employees to take bribes (Huther & Shah, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Privatisation limited
to responsibility for the administration of hospitals or educational institutions in hopes of cutting costs
may encourage employees to respond to cuts in wages and reduced resources for providing services by
taking bribes. Privatisation introduces competition by creating expanding choices between institutions
within a community. Its effects depend upon how access is determined. If the state gives vouchers to
poorer people that meet the cost of privatised institutions this would give poor people an effective
alternative to paying a bribe to a public official. If a privatised official asked for a bribe, a person could
turn to another alternative, generating a fall in revenue that would be a market signal to the employer
of dishonest staff. However, insofar as charges for private-sector institutions were not fully met by
universally available vouchers, our findings suggest that any increase in the exit of better off people to
more widely available but costly choice institutions would increase inequality because poorer people
would be even more disproportionately vulnerable to corrupt public services. Thus, it would be
possible for an increase in the scope for choice to produce a net fall in bribery while also generating
a net increase in inequality.
Writing with a focus on Western societies, Hirschman (1970, p. 21ff) calls attention to the potential
of dissatisfied citizens to exercise voice through the ballot box or public protests. Since casting a ballot
or participating in a demonstration does not require a substantial income, it can be done by poorer
people aggrieved by corrupt services. However, the capacity to do so is institutionally contingent:
people must live in a country where free competitive elections hold politicians accountable. This
condition is not met in many African societies (Freedom House, 2016). A second condition is that
aggrieved individuals must have the political skills, social resources and free time and energy to
engage in non-remunerated political activities. These conditions are less likely to be met by poor
Africans (Bratton et al., 2005). Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) interprets the absence or weakness of voice to
reduce corruption in developing countries as a low-level equilibrium trap in which the institutionalisa-
tion of an unequal distribution of power enables those who collect bribes to prevent the disruption of a
system from which they benefit.
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Notes
1. Our focus is on public sector bribery, not bribes made to non-state actors.
2. In an analysis of the 2005 Afrobarometer survey, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007) include a variable that they label as
measuring contact but this is a flawed measure of contact because respondents not having contact were given two non-mutually
exclusive response options to the bribery questions: They could say that they had ‘never paid a bribe’ or had ‘no experience’ with
the service. The unusual variations across countries with these two responses showed that ‘no experience’was not universally used
as an indication of non-contact. For example, less than 3 per cent of Benin’s sample reported ‘no experience’ with services.
3. The World Bank’s World Development Index (WDI) provides data on the per cent of primary and secondary school aged
children that attend private institutions. For all Afrobarometer countries (and most other African countries), private institu-
tions are used by varying percentages of primary and secondary school aged children. The WDI also shows all African
countries, except Somalia, report having both private and public health expenditures. Comparable data on the private/public
provision of water and sanitation services is not provided by the WDI and could not be found elsewhere.
4. This is somewhat surprising given that Justesen and Bjornskov (2014) find that well off urbanites are least likely bribe payers.
In an unreported multinomial logit model, we test for the significance of this interaction term; the interaction term was
significantly associated with being a bribe payer to both types of services, but not to the other two categories. The estimated
effect, however, was in an unexpected direction; for the least poor (a minimum score on the poverty index), being an urbanite
is estimated to increase the probability of being a bribe payer to both types of services by just 2 per cent. Also tested were
each of the models, restricted to a sample of urbanites only. Our main findings were robust in these unreported models as
well; specifically, the multinomial logit revealed that the poor in urban areas were no more likely to pay bribes for monopoly
services than not pay a bribe, but were more likely to pay a bribe for choice services and to both types of services. And the
Heckman analysis showed that the poor in urban areas were more likely to have contact with non-monopoly services, and
once this contact was accounted for, were no more likely to pay a bribe for those services.
5. Due to concerns of potential endogeneity of perceptions of corruption and the payment of bribes, in unreported models we
reran the analyses in Tables 1 and 2, excluding perceptions of corruption as a control variable. The results of these models
were very similar to those reported; most important, the significance and direction of poverty’s influence on contact and
bribery is estimated to be the same in both sets of tests.
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